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Garrison Summary
A Generational History of Environmental
Law and Its Grand Themes:
A Near Decade of
Garrison Lectures
JEFFREY G. MILLER*

I have been privileged to hear, enjoy and learn from the talks
of each of our Garrison Lecturers during the last eight years, as
well as our discussions with them here today. In preparation for
my duties as a summarizer, I studied their talks, printed in our
Pace Environmental Law Review. I was delighted to find that the
body of their commentary is far more than the sum of its parts.
Together our lecturers take us on a grand journey through the history of modern environmental law, its heroes and villains, its accomplishments and its weaknesses. Together they sound all the
grand themes of environmental law. Together they remind us
where we have been and where we must go. It is no surprise their
talks have been edifying and provocative, after all, they are preeminent environmental law scholars and environmental law actors of the first order. I suppose it should not have surprised me
to see how much more weight their talks carried in the aggregate
than separately, for environmental law is not the product of a few
individuals, but of many environmental lawyers working in concert across the country and in successive decades. It continues to
develop as a product of what is now a small army of environmental lawyers, many of them students of our lecturers and of our program here at Pace Law School.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Studies, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York. Seven distinguished Garrison Lecturers
have given presentations at Pace over the years. On February 21, 2002, they gathered at Pace to hear the presentation of the eighth and to discuss as a group the state
of environmental law. James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry, led
the discussion. This paper expands on my oral summary of their talks and of that
discussion. I am grateful to Michelle Land, for her wise suggestions and editorial
assistance.
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Our lecturers complimented New York, reminding us of the
importance of the state in the creation and history of environmental law. The Adirondacks Preserve, with its "forever wild" talisman, led the way to large-scale preservation of natural areas.'
Teddy Roosevelt, a New Yorker, made our national parks, national monuments and natural forests blossom. 2 More recently,
the Scenic Hudson3 litigation, pioneered by Lloyd Garrison and
completed by our first Garrison Lecturer, David Sive, 4 demonstrated that environmentalists could use litigation to prevent
harmful development and preserve natural areas. David Sive, of
course, was a recent colleague of ours at Pace Law School for several years. Not long after Scenic Hudson, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) were born in New York City, with David Sive as one of
NRDC's original board members and Gustave Speth, our moderator today, as one of its founding members. Additionally, we should
never forget the role of the quintessential New York enterprisethe national media. The New Yorker magazine first published
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, the clarion wake-up call that heralded the modern environmental movement. The New York Times
has been a constant reminder that environmental problems demand solutions. Without the New York Times, no one would have
heard of Love Canal, and without Love Canal, there would be
no Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA). 5 New York's contribution to environmental protection, however, is but an historic footnote unless New
Yorkers today continue a leadership role. We at Pace Law School
hope we are continuing that tradition of leadership by training
lawyers here and around the world, to build and develop environmental law in the twenty first century.
1. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. The Forest Preserve, the state owned land in the
Catskill and Adirondack State Parks, is to be kept "forever wild." Id.
2. See generally EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX (2001).
3. Lloyd Garrison represented the environmentalists in the landmark Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965). David Sive represented them in follow-up litigation, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974), in which he established that
the power company could not proceed with dumping rocks and debris into the Hudson
while building a pump storage unit at Storm King, without a permit under the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
4. David Sive, The LitigationProcess in the Development of Environmental Law,
13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) amended by Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat.
2356 (2002).
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Of course, New York's role is only part of the entire picture in
the development of environmental law. The Garrison Lectures
provide valuable insight into the national evolution of environmental law as well. Prof. William Rodgers described environmental law using a geologic metaphor emphasizing complexity,
layering, anomalies, box canyons, and gradual erosion. 6 Several
other lecturers hinted at a biological metaphor, emphasizing its
generational aspects. 7 I like the biological metaphor better, with
its complexity, constant evolution and very human failings. After
all, the law and its component fields-like the biosphere with its
component ecosystems and species-is a complex adaptive system; a living system that adapts to changing conditions and continually evolves. 8 In biological systems, we cannot exist and
thrive without parents. David Sive is often called the parent of
environmental law because of his pioneering role, after Lloyd Garrison, as a litigator in Scenic Hudson, as well as his founding role
in and stewardship of the Environmental Law Institute (ELI),
NRDC, and the American Law Institute-American Bar Association (ALI/ABA) environmental law programs. More accurately,
however, he is but one of the parents of environmental law. Prof.
Richard Lazarus 9 tells us that Professors Joseph Sax, 10 William
Rodgers, and Oliver Houck,' 1 also are all among the founding gen2
eration of environmental lawyers.'
Parenting, by definition, involves participation in the creation
of new life. Scenic Hudson was a creative and defining moment
for the new field of environmental law. Lloyd Garrison and later,
6. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Defeating EnvironmentalLaw: The Geology of Legal
Advantage, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
7. Richard Lazarus tells us that David Sive, Joseph Sax and Oliver Houck were
in the first generation of environmental lawyers and that he is among the first of the
second generation. Richard Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law
in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999). A. Dan Tarlock's talk, The
Future of Environmental 'Rule of Law' Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2000),
is, among other things, an examination of several generations of environmental law.
His identification of the different generations is somewhat different than suggested in
this paper.
8. Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation:Mr. Justice Scalia
Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REV. 409 (2000).
9. Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental ProtectionLaw in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
10. Joseph L Sax, Using Property Rights to Attach Environmental Protection, 14
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1996).

11.

Oliver Houck, EnvironmentalLaw and the General Welfare, 16 PACE ENVTL.

L. REV. 1 (1998).

12.

Lazarus, supra note 9, at 2.
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David Sive, convinced judges to suddenly discover that the environment and environmental values were part of the public welfare
protected in many statutes. They breathed new life into old laws,
stopping Consolidated Edison's plans to build a pump storage unit
on Storm King Mountain that would ruin one of the most beautiful and celebrated landscapes on the east coast-our Hudson
Highlands. Prof. Dan Tarlock 13 comments that this was a paradigm environmentalist lawsuit, the beginning of what he calls environmental 'Rule of Law' litigation. 14 First, the court
acknowledged the unprecedented standing of a group of citizens to
protect aesthetic values. 15 Second, the court found that a statute
enacted before widespread environmental concern could and
should be read to give the implementing agency authority to consider aesthetic values in its decisions and therefore that it was
mandated to do so. Finally, the result was a remand.' 6 The victory was procedural, but the result was sufficient delay to mobilize
popular and political forces to stop the project. This set the pattern for much litigation by environmentalists, even under the major federal environmental statutes of the 1970s, many of which
follow the same pattern, particularly under the National Environ17
mental Policy Act (NEPA).
David Sive was not the only litigator to breathe new life into
old laws. Others were expanding public nuisance doctrine to protect against environmental insults. Still others were resurrecting
the Refuse Act of 189918 for use in a national program of water
pollution control.' 9 Indeed, David Sive posits that litigation has
played a more important and dominant role in the environmental
13. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental 'Rule of Law' Litigation, 17
237 (2000).
14. Id. at 244-46.
15. Id. at 245.
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 401. Prof. Tarlock uses this as an example of an old statute, conceived for other purposes and later adapted for the new use of protecting the environment. Prof. Rodgers, however, uses it as an example of seventy years of neglect by the
Corps of Engineers to implement a pollution control statute. Rodgers, supra note 6, at
4. Since widespread concern for water pollution had not begun by 1899, I suspect
Prof. Tarlock has the stronger case.
19. Indeed, Prof. Houck reminds us that much of that work was done by the U.S.
Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York. Houck, supra note 11, at 2.
Moreover, much of the work there was done by Daniel Riesel, then an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, and later, a long-time partner of David Sive and a frequent co-chair with
David for many ALTIABA environmental law programs.
PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
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movement than in any other social development. 20 While that
claim may be challenged, 21 there is no doubt that the role of litigation was a decisive and dominant one in the first generation of
environmental law. It dominated the early development of environmental law however, only because of the expansion of the
traditional standing doctrine achieved by Lloyd Garrison and
David Sive in Scenic Hudson.22 That expansion empowered public
interest law firms, exemplified by NRDC, whose very reason for
existence was to shape environmental law by bringing court actions to protect the environment. 23 Fortunately, their efforts coincided with a high degree of judicial activism exemplifying the
24
federal courts at that time.
Parenting is more than creating new life; parenting also is
nurturing new life and raising it to be independent and successful
in its own right; it is producing a new generation. David Sive was
a true parent in this capacity as well, spending untold time and
energy educating us in his ALI/ABA courses and helping to develop a field of law as a member or director of the ALI, ELI, NRDC
and initial chair of the Legal Advisory Committee of the Council
on Environmental Quality. 25 David Sive's efforts, and those of his
founding father's generation, were focused largely on litigation,
implanting environmental values among the traditional values
protected by public welfare litigation. He sings psalms in praise of
20. Sive, supra note 5, at 3 (citing a quotation of his in CROSSROADS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE (Peter Borelli ed., 1989)).

21. The civil rights movement, for instance, relied on litigation and demonstrations to highlight racial injustice and demand redress. Indeed, Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), played a galvanizing role for the civil rights movement analogous to the role of Scenic Hudson in the environmental movement. The
environmental movement learned from the civil rights movement, using both litigation and demonstrations to highlight environmental problems and demand remedial
legislation. If Scenic Hudson was an analogue of Brown, the Earth Day demonstrations were analogues to civil rights demonstrations. Indeed, Sive playfully admits as
much, saying that he is particularly fond of the proposition because it cannot be
proven one way or the other. Sive, supra note 4, at 3.
22. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
23. As Sive points out in his lecture, NRDC and other public interest law firms
were able to develop environmental law relatively cheaply by initially concentrating
on challenges to final agency actions. These appeals were on the record, requiring no
witnesses or discovery. Sive, supra note 4, at 16-17.
24. Tarlock, supra note 14, at 251. See also Robert Glicksman, A Retreat from
JudicialActivism: the Seventh Circuit and the Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
209 (1987).
25. The initial members of the Committee included Prof. Sax, and Pace's own
Prof. Nicholas Robinson.
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litigation, with good reason, for it is a field where David could and
sometimes did defeat Goliath.
The second generation of environmental law and lawyers was
fundamentally different than the first. If the first generation
lived for the courtroom, convincing judges to graft environmental
values on the rootstock of traditional doctrines and old (non-environmental) statutes, the second generation created and implemented statutes and regulations devoted entirely to environmental law. That generation began with the decade that saw the
enactment of the modern panoply of federal environmental protection and pollution control statutes and their state analogues,
starting with NEPA in 1969 and ending with CERCLA in 1980.
As a result of this avalanche of legislation, environmental law today is overwhelmingly statutory and regulatory. While the length
of EPA's statutes approximately equate the length of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 the length of EPA's regulations undoubtedly surpass those of the Internal Revenue Service. 27
The new legislation embodied two concepts that Prof. Houck
identified as critical to the successes of environmental law: The
institutionalization of transparency and the search for alternatives. 28 Of course, NEPA is the exemplar of both, requiring that
governmental decisions affecting the environment be made in
public and only after exploring the impact of the proposed action
on the environment and whether alternative actions might affect
the environment less. Prof. Rodgers disparages NEPA as all process and no substance, at least as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. 2 9 But lawyers know that differences in procedure can be

outcome determinative. 30 In any event, there is little doubt that
transparency is one of the themes of the environmental statutes
and that it has affected their implementation, allowing public participation in critical decisions and preventing them from being
made behind closed doors. The statutes have a panoply of require26. The EPA statute pages in SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STATUTES (West
Publ'g educational ed. 2001-2002) contains 899 pages, while the Internal Revenue
Code contains approximately 874 pages.
27. The Internal Revenue Service regulations, 26 C.F.R. §§ 1-801, contain approximately 10,660 pages. The Environmental Protection Agency regulations, 40
C.F.R. §§ 1-799 and §§ 1400-1700, contain approximately 15,990 pages.
28. Houck, supra note 11, at 4-7.
29. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 14-15.
30. I am under the impression from discussions with lawyers and professors from
around the world that the greatest differences between environmental law in the common law countries and civil law countries is not in substance, but rather in implementation and procedure.
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ments for public participation, but perhaps none has been as critical in the development of environmental law as the citizen suit. In
citizen suits, the statutes created a new vehicle for litigation, enabling private citizens to sue the government for failure to implement the statutes and to sue the regulated public for violating the
statutes. Transparency and citizen participation are characteristics of our administrative law, and greatly distinguish it from the
law of other countries. Environmental law takes citizen participation to a new level with citizen suits and heightens transparency
in the Toxics Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRKA), 3 1 which requires
private companies to report publicly on their use of toxic materials
and their releases of them to the environment. With no regulatory
program beyond annual reports, this measure has made great
strides in reducing the uses, and hence the environmental release,
32
of environmentally hazardous materials.
As Prof. Houck reminds us, the search for alternatives has
been more successful in pollution control than in natural resource
management, a conclusion with which Prof. Sax would no doubt
agree. With our penchants for tinkering and invention, we have
developed alternative production technologies, treatment technologies, and management practices enabling us to greatly reduce
the amounts of pollutants released into our environment by industrial, commercial, and governmental establishments. However,
there are no technological fixes for profligate land and natural resource use. In fact, as Prof. Houck comments, our efforts to manage land use and natural resources "have simply failed."33 While
the search for alternatives has enabled us to make wise decisions
on the use of public lands, it has not helped much in infusing the
public good into decisions on the use of private lands. Our efforts
to achieve environmental goals through controls on private land
use are greatly hampered by our constitutional protections on private property, our traditional concepts of the sanctity of private
property, and our traditional views that land use controls are
state and local matters best isolated from federal authority. Enter
the property rights movement and its attempt to dismantle envi31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
32. See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Toxic RELEASE IN-

1999 DATA RELEASE, at http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri99/index.htm (last
visited April 5, 2002).
33. Houck, supra note 11, at 4.
VENTORY
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ronmental law, as described by Prof. Sax. 3 4 On a more hopeful
note, Prof. Sax in his remarks described how the Department of
Interior used the Endangered Species Act 35 in several cases to
achieve ecosystem management on public and private lands. He
believed this could be a new paradigm in environmental law.
This spat of environmental legislation in the 1970s represented a political victory for the environmental movement, which
reminds us, as does Prof. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 36 that environmental protection, like all social concerns, is ultimately a political matter. Politics, however, is not a one-way street. Forces opposed to
environmental protection have used politics, first by attempting to
enact legislation implementing former Rep. Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," 37 as decried by David Sive, 38 and later by attempting to enact "property rights" legislation, decried by Prof.
Sax.3 9 Politics, of course, does not affect environmental law only
through the enactment by Congress and state legislatures of proor anti-environmental legislation; politics also affects environmental law through the implementation of environmental statutes by
Presidents and governors with pro- and anti-environmental philosophies. The environmental depredations of the Watt/Gorsuch
team in the first Reagan administration are a prime example of
the harm that the environment can suffer at the hands of an executive branch not attuned to environmental values. 40 Indeed, most
of the examples of the neglect, diversion, acquisition and sale,
abandonment, process transformation, exception, pretense, and
marginalization of environmental law, which Prof. Rodgers gave
us in his lecture, 4 1 were created by the executive branch. They are
what lie behind Prof. Tarlock's observation that environmental
law is characterized more by irony and paradox than by unifying
34. See generally Sax, supra note 10.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
36. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem-Coping
With The Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 422 (2002).
37. See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN By REP. NEwT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION.

(Ed

Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). See also Thomas 0. McGarity, Deflecting the
Assault: How EPA Survived A "Disorganized"Revolution By "Reinventing" Itself A
Bit, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,249 (Nov. 2001).
38. Sive, supra note 4, at 22-24, 29-30.
39. Sax, supra note 10, at 1.
40. Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress, and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of
EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 18 ENVTL. L. 683 (1988).
41. See generally Rodgers, supra note 6.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/3

8

20021

A NEAR DECADE OF GARRISON LECTURES

509

legal principles. 42 We sometimes forget that politics also affects
the federal judiciary, for judges are appointed through a political
process. The appointment of judges by predominantly conservative administrations over the last two decades 4 3 is bound to affect
environmental law. Indeed, Prof. Houck outlines how our current
federal judiciary appears to be returning us to constitutional doctrines of the early twentieth century, hemming in federal powers
on all sides. 44 Worse yet, Prof. Lazarus' analysis of some 250 of
the Supreme Court's environmental law opinions suggests the
45
Court actually appears to disfavor environmental protection.
That is bad news for environmental law, which has historically
been developed in the courts and which depends on strong federal
powers to flourish. Perhaps, if all else fails, we can develop the
general welfare clause in the Constitution's preamble, in conjunction with the taxing and spending power4 6 as Prof. Houck
suggests .47
Of course we carry the genes of the first generation, reflected
in our zeal for protecting the environment and our reliance on litigation to enforce our statutes and regulations. During the second
generation, the importance of litigation in developing environmental law was emphasized when forces against environmental protection copied the environmental movement by commissioning
their own public interest law firms, such as the Pacific Legal
Foundation, using litigation to develop an anti-environmental
law. Indeed, Prof. Rodgers has a sinister view of environmental
litigation, finding it most often used by anti-environmental forces
to frustrate environmental goals and seeing environmental lawyers as the chief gainers from the complexity of environmental
law.

48

42. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 238.
43. See Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, at 104. This article chronicles the federal court selections in the Reagan, G. H.W. Bush, Clinton and G.W. Bush presidencies, noting the
conservative strategy in the Reagan and Bush administrations and the consequences
of those strategies. See also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between
Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408-09. ("Bush v. Gore was troubling because
it suggested that the Court was motivated by a particular kind of partisanship [in
that] the five conservatives installed a president who would appoint their colleagues
and successors and would stock the Federal judiciary with like-minded conservatives.") Id.
44. Houck, supra note 11, at 8-11.
45. Id. at 13.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
47. Houck, supra note 11, at 11-14.
48. Rodgers, supra note 6, at 2-3.
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What of the third generation? Will it rely more on non-confrontational mechanisms than the first and second, as our Prof.
Tarlock 4 9 suggests? And what about the generation of our present
students? Will it be more driven by our shrinking world?
While each generation has its own unique hallmarks, carryover to future generations is inevitable. Based on the behavior of
the second generation, it looks as if the tendency to litigate is not a
recessive gene and will carry on strongly in succeeding generations, although to different ends. We are farily adept at seeing the
mistakes of our parents' generation and, hopefully, at avoiding
them. The strategies of the past have met their limits. We cannot
have clean water without addressing non-point sources and Total
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs). 50 We cannot have clean air
without including SUVs, pickup trucks and other monster vehicles in our fuel economy standards. Command and control is not
good at nuance. However, we should not forget that many of the
past strategies have continuing vitality. Point sources are remarkably well controlled by Best Available Technology (BAT)
standards, permits, enforcement and citizen suits. Fuel economy
standards do work if they cover the right universe and are enforced. Command and control will have a role as long as we are
motivated by the profit incentive and as long as it is more profitable not to comply with environmental law norms than to comply
with them. More cooperative and nuanced strategies undoubtedly
will bring us new successes. Still, as Enron reminds us, cooperation and nuance are unlikely to influence those most obsessed
with the almighty dollar and to divert their attention and resources to less profitable or even unprofitable actions for the public good. When Enron championed energy deregulation, it did not
do so for the good of the public or the environment. Would economic incentives or participation in EPA's ExCel program make a
model citizen of Bin Laden Enterprises?
Each generation spends considerable energy in its formative
years wondering if there is a God and, if so, what is she like? So
too, each generation of environmental lawyers must spend time
wondering if there is such a thing as environmental law and, if so,
49. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 269-72.

50. See Oliver Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Afterschock and
Prelude,32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,385 (April 2002); see also Oliver Houck,
TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier,29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469 (Aug. 1999);
Oliver Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework For The Clean Water Act's Ambient
StandardsProgram, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415 (Aug. 1998).
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what is it? Fortunately, in law we save a lot time and energy of
lawyers and the public by confining much of that existential activity to law school faculty members. Less than overwhelming enrollment in jurisprudence courses tells us that most lawyers
believe it is just as well left to us. Well, how about it, is there a
field of environmental law? Prof. Lazarus tells us the Supreme
Court does not think there is and that it views environmental law
as just a subset of administrative law, raising "no special issues or
concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a substantive area of
law."5 1 Similarly, Prof. Tarlock, has difficulty finding a jurispru52
dential base for environmental law.
On the other hand, several environmental committees of Congress tell us there is environmental law. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, and their state
counterparts tell us there is. The environmental law division of
the Department of Justice, and counterpart divisions of almost all
states attorney's general offices, tell us there is. The environmental law division of the ABA, every state bar association, and most
metropolitan bar associations tell us there is. A section of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) tells us there is.
Casebooks for law students and treatises for practitioners tell us
there is. Of course, we do not necessarily believe the Bible, the
Koran, the Torah and other sacred texts when they tell us there is
a God. But perhaps that is because they are so very contradictory
about who they tell us God is.
I suspect the Attorneys General, the law associations and the
casebook and treatise writers are in much stronger agreement on
what constitutes environmental law than are the sacred texts in
telling us who and what is God. The environmental authorities
would mostly agree that environmental law is that body of law,
primarily statutory, that manages and seeks to protect environmental resources for the health, use and enjoyment of the present
public, and of succeeding generations of the public. Still, as Prof.
Tarlock asks, what unity does it have as a matter of jurisprudence
or legal doctrine?5 3 Is it anything beyond a subset of administrative law, as Prof. Lazarus concludes the Supreme Court believes? 5 4 Prof. Tarlock proposes one possible jurisprudential basis
for environmental law: The "science-based ethical stewardship ob51. Lazarus, supra note 9, at 14.
52. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 238-41.

53. Id. at 238.
54. Lazarus, supra note 9, at 14.
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ligations to conserve natural systems for ourselves as well as for
future generations." 55 This is not far from the expanded public
trust doctrine that Prof. Gerald Torres proposes. 5 6 Prof. Tarlock
ultimately rejects the stewardship principle as a jurisprudential
basis for environmental law because it is too much at odds with
our philosophical and legal traditions and our behavior. He sees
our traditions and behavior as reflecting fundamental social values, including property rights, which enhance the human dignity
of the living, rather than placing value on protecting future generations and non-human entities. 5 7 Moreover, often neither statutes nor judicial decisions embrace stewardship explicitly as a
legal principle. Finally, Prof. Tarlock looks primarily to judicial
decisions as a basis for discerning jurisprudential principles. He
finds that the signal environmental victories in the courts do not
establish environmental protection principles, but rather reiterate
existing principles in that the government must follow clear legislative mandates; must exercise discretion given to it by legislation
or justify its failure to do so; and must follow established procedures.5 8 This takes us back to the Supreme Court's view of environmental law as simply an undifferentiated part of administrative law.
Jurisprudence and legal doctrine are not confined to judgemade law. Most of the world's legal systems are code systems, not
common law systems, and do not adhere to the stare decisis use of
precedent as does the Anglo-American common law system. That
does not mean they are without jurisprudence or legal doctrine.
Our legal system is more like the civil law system than we admit,
for our contemporary legal system is primarily governed by statute and regulation, not by judge-made law. And if we look within
each of the two main components of statutory environmental law,
we will discern a good deal of commonality. In terms of pollution
control, the polluter pays and the precautionary principles are
well established across most of the field. So is the derivative principle that polluters must use the best available technologies and
management practices available to minimize encroachments by
pollutants on public resources. So is the principle that if BAT is
not sufficient to protect public resources for their designated uses,
55. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 238-39, 248-50.
56. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 241-44

(2000).
57. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 249.
58. Id. at 250-51.
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the polluter must take further measures to do so. So are the
standard setting, permitting, inspection, enforcement, and public
participation mechanisms and procedures employed by the statutes. So is the complex system for sharing authority and responsibility between the federal and state governments. There is so
much commonality in our pollution control statutes that judicial
precedent is often applicable across several statutes. While I am
not as familiar with the regimes for managing natural resources, I
suspect there are similar commonalities in them. Prof. Tarlock's
own water resource management casebook and treatise unify
water resource management doctrines operating in our fifty states
into two basic systems, both with emerging themes to reconcile
private interests and public interests. 59 Although the resource
management and pollution control laws seem like very different
legal fields, Prof. Torres demonstrated in his aptly entitled "Who
Owns the Sky?"60 discussion, that the public trust doctrine in its
broadest sense may unify them. The public trust doctrine
emerges from management of public resources. Trusts exist for
the benefit of future generations as well as the present one. Our
primary pollution control programs center on preventing the degradation of our most necessary public resources-air and water.
Even though western water use is private, the water itself is not
and private use is ultimately managed for the public good. Moreover, this protection is basic to our personal dignity.
There is a certain Cassandra-like quality in parts of the lectures. The environment faces so many threats and environmental
law is beset from so many quarters. When the economy takes a
downturn or when the public is focused on more immediate matters such as war or terrorism, it seems that environmental protection slips a notch or two. But that has not decreased the strength
or pervasiveness of environmental law over time, as it has continued to grow in all dimensions. If this is so, why are we always refighting the same battles? Why do we have to fend off the barbarians from our pollution control laws every few years? Why do we
have to fight the robber barons every few years to keep our public
lands public? Is there no public consensus behind our environmental law? If not, how can it endure?
59. See C. MEYERS ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); see also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (3d ed. 1988).
60. Torres, supra note 56, at 227.
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The Cassandra cries are wakeup calls, none more so than
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, which in many ways was the beginning of our present environmental movement. Professors Sax'
and Rodgers' lectures were certainly such Cassandra cries. The
Scenic Hudson suit in a way was a wakeup call to our judicial
system, warning that it must respond to contemporary environmental needs. Even with the consistent and deep support that environmental protection has from the public, these reminders are
necessary, for in the midst of conflicting needs we sometimes forget about the environment. So environmental lawyers remind me
of Sisyphus, the ancient Greek condemned to roll the boulder to
the summit, only to have it roll down again to the plain, from
which he must perpetually roll it back to the summit, into eternity. There is great nobility in his dogged determination at that
task, although he never wins, but only achieves an uneasy sort of
stasis. Similarly, we toilers at environmental law work to the
bone to achieve environmental gains, only to find them eroded
during the next generation. Unfortunately, in the meantime our
mountain has grown a little higher, making the summit yet
harder to attain. But our children will win the gains back in the
next generation, and perhaps achieve additional gains, only to
have them lost and regained again. Such is the nature of the
human condition. In the struggle is nobility, the victory is illusory, and, as long as we struggle, defeat is pyric.
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